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RATCHETING BACK: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS A CONSTRAINT ON EXECUTIVE
POWER
Deborah N. Pearlstein*
Constitutional scholars have long noted the historic
tendency of the Executive to accrue power in times of security
concern.1 In this respect, the George W. Bush Administration
might generally be understood to have fulfilled constitutional
expectations-asserting broad power in the years following the
devastating attacks of September 11 to detain, interrogate, and
try suspected terrorists, notwithstanding treaty obligations
arguably to the contrary.2 As we begin assessing the still new
Obama Administration, it thus seems necessary to ask whether it
is fulfilling the closely related constitutional expectation: that
presidential power over national security only grows over time.3
By most accounts, the history of executive power relative to the
other branches has been one of dramatic, often security-driven,
expansion.4 The expansion is attributed to a number of factors,
including not only the Executive's institutional ability to act with
speed and initiative, but also to the domestic and international
*
Visiting Faculty Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Associate
Research Scholar, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton
University. Special thanks to Nandu Machiraju for research assistance.
1. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Louis Henkin, Michael J.
Glennon & William D. Rogers eds., 1990); HAROLD H.KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990);
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2003).
2. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1257-68 & n.52 (2006)
(summarizing aspects of U.S. detention and interrogation policy, and noting potential
challenges under relevant constitutional and treaty obligations). Uses of the phrase
"Bush Administration" hereinafter will refer to the Administration of George W. Bush.
3. See generally KOH, supra note l; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
4. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 1; SCHLESINGER, supra note 3; William P. Marshall,
Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 505, 518-19 (2008).
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political incentives that shape the presidency. As Harold Koh
put it (writing in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal): "[A]
pervasive national perception that the presidency must act
swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-moving international
events has almost inevitably forced the executive branch into a
continuing pattern of evasion" of restraint.5 Moreover, far from
acting as a constraining external force on increasingly bold
assertions of presidential authority, Congress and especially the
courts have allowed the President to assert it. 6 Together, such
forces combine to ensure that only a one-way ratchet is applied
to presidential power.
Yet the recent change of presidential administration
provides an intriguing set of examples by which one might
measure the continued salience of the one-way ratchet paradigm
in the post-September 11 world. Among other contrasts, the
Administrations of Bush and Obama would appear by
composition to differ substantially in their relative commitment
to international law as a meaningful constraint on national
power. The Bush Administration had asserted broad executive
power to resist the application of international law in a way that
would constrain U.S. counterterrorism operations. It had also
advanced the view that the power to interpret treaty
obligations-to "say what the law is" as provided by treaties 
rests primarily or even exclusively with the Executive himself.7
The interpretation power in particular has been of some
significance
in
inter-branch
battles
past;
indeed,
'"reinterpretation"' had become a central means by which
Presidents have effectively amended treaty obligations they
found troubling.8
In seeming distinction, the Obama Administration thus far
has been peopled with officials almost certain to hold a contrary
view. Among others, Legal Adviser to the State Department
Harold Koh under President Obama has built a career
advocating for careful adherence to international law as part of
"our law."9 Obama Administration Director of the State
5. KOH, supra note 1, at 122.
6. Id. at 123-49.
7. See infra passim.
8. KOH, supra note 1, at 43-45 (discussing the controversy over President
Reagan's broad reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty).
9. Harold H. Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, AM. J. INT'L L., Oct.
2004, at 43; Harold H. Koh, Mark Janis and the American Tradition of International Law,
21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2006).
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Department Office of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter
has likewise advocated measures to make international law more
effective in constraining national power by promoting more
direct engagement within domestic legal systems.10 Does the
Obama Administration resist asserting a similar degree of
interpretive prerogative over international law? Or does the
one-way ratchet effect prove too great a temptation in this
regard?
While it is still early enough in the Obama Administration
to make any conclusions uncertain, this essay considers a set of
steps that might be seen to reflect a greater willingness by the
Administration to acknowledge limits imposed on the Executive
by treaty commitments, and arguably a greater willingness to
share power to interpret treaties with the courts. If these early
indications prove meaningful, they raise a series of questions
about the political and structural mechanisms said to drive the
one-way ratchet. In the world of incentives the one-way ratchet
view describes, why would an Executive move to restore any
constraints on power? This essay considers the Obama
Administration's early engagements with the international law
of armed conflict-and the Geneva Conventions in particular 
in an attempt to explore some potential answers.
Following a brief background discussion of the longstanding
debate over the treaty power, this essay highlights a set of
differences between the Bush and Obama Administrations on
matters of treaty interpretation in U.S. counterterrorism
operations. It then considers a series of explanations to account
for the modest shifts, exploring what if anything these
differences might tell us about why a nation facing security
threat would ratchet back claims of executive power in the face
of international law.
A note of caution is in order. Extrapolating from individual
policy decisions to broad state behaviors is always a dicey
proposition-especially so when there are differences of opinion
among key decision-makers, and when there are so few
examples from the current Administration from which to draw.
The one-way ratchet view in particular might readily discount
10. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International
Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 327, 346 (2006)
(urging that international law must "push states toward participation in international
institutions and the international legal system generally so that the functions of
international law . . . can take hold and influence state behavior and outcomes").
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the significance of any modest evidence of ratcheting back; over
time, such examples might well appear to be no more than short
lived blips along what is an otherwise broadly linear trajectory.
Yet such blips seem important to study-not only because they
may prove a harbinger of a larger trend, but also because they
can shed light on the limits of the political and structural
conditions that have so far stood to explain why U.S. executive
power trends upwards. If exceptions exist at all, they may tell us
whether and how those conditions are susceptible to change.
TREATY POWER DEBATES PRE-2009 IN A NUTSHELL
Controversy surrounding how much formal power the
Executive enjoys to interpret or otherwise modify international
treaty obligations was hardly new to the Bush Administration.
On one side of the historic debate are those who believe that the
Executive enjoys substantial power to interpret (even violate)
treaties as a result of his formal power under Article II of the
Constitution (to "make" treaties), and his functional advantap;es
as the "sole organ" of the United States in foreign relations.1 A
set of twentieth-century Supreme Court statements-noting that
the "meaning given [treaties] by the departments of government
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
given great weight"12 -would seem to support this distribution of
power, with judicial deference doctrine rightly serving as no
"mere window dressing, but rather [as] a significant factor in
treaty interpretation. "13
Others have maintained that whatever limited power the
Executive has over treaty interpretation is shared, at best, with
11. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 873-74 (2001) (reviewing
FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS, AND
THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000)); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33 ( 1995) (arguing that presidential authority to interpret treaties
and act unilaterally in foreign affairs has a strong historical basis).
12. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 ( 1961); accord United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353, 369 ( 1989) ; Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184--85
( 1982) ; Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 ( 1933); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433,
442 ( 1921); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468 ( 1913).
13. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649,
701 (2000) ; see also David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as
Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1439 ( 1999) (arguing judicial deference
increased during twentieth century); Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation,
86 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2008) (arguing that twentieth-century courts deferred regularly to
"executive pronouncements of foreign affairs").
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the independent power of the courts to "say what the law is"
under Article III.14 True that the Constitution grants the
Executive the power to "make" treaties,15 but it separately
allocates primary interpretive power to the courts, extendin� the
"judicial power" to all cases arising under "treaties made,"1 and
otherwise making treaties part of the "supreme law of the land"
to which all state court judges, among others, are bound.17
Accordingly, the Court has long and rightly exercised its
independent authority to interpret treaties as it sees fit, with the
Founding-era Court in particular showing no deference at all to
Executive views on the meaning of treaties.18 The Court's passing
language of deference to Executive treaty interpretation has thus
been "[m]uch like a blimp," a doctrine that seems "ponderous
but in reality has no weight."19
In the face of unsettled debates about how much power the
Executive has to interpret or otherwise confront treaty
obligations, and correspondingly how much deference the courts
do, and should, show the Executive's views, the Bush
Administration pressed an understanding of the executive treaty
power at the broadest end of the spectrum. In the
counterterrorism realm, the President's Commander-in-Chief
power weighed against any construction of the Geneva
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
15. U.S.CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16. U.S.CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
17. U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2, cl. 2; see also Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as 'Supreme Law of the
Land,' 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120 (1999) ("[T]he framers were virtually of one mind
when it came to giving treaties the status of law . . . . The imperative need to make
treaties legally binding on both the states and their citizens was widely recognized by
1787. The major consequence of this perception was the ready adoption of the supremacy
clause, which gave treaties the status of law and made them judicially enforceable
through the federal courts. "' (quoting Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle:
The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233, 264 (1984))); Michael
P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1276-77
(2002) (arguing, inter alia, that in light of the Framers' understanding of the separation of
powers, a commitment to the Executive of the power to "make" treaties would preclude
the vesting in the same branch of the power to interpret them);
18. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretation: A
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2007).
19. Martin Flaherty, Globalization and Executive Power 5-20 (Dec. 22, 1006,
unpublished manuscript on file with author). In any case, it is not possible to demonstrate
either a logical or actual causal relationship between deference to the Executive's views
per se and the outcome of the Court's treaty decisions. Robert M. Chesney,
Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretation, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1723 (2007) (surveying published opinions of the federal judiciary between
1984-2005).
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Conventions (regulating armed conflict) that would have the
effect of constraining executive power. As an early memo from
the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
explained in construing the scope of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions so as not to cover the U.S. conflict with al
Qaeda: "[T]he Commander-in-Chief power gives the President
the plenary authority in determining how best to deploy troops
in the field. Any congressional effort to restrict presidential
authority by subjecting the conduct of the U.S. Armed Forces to
a broad construction of the Geneva Convention, one that is not
clearly borne by its text, would represent a possible infringement
on president discretion to direct the military."2° Common Article
3 contains a set of basic restrictions on the treatment and trial of
detainees in armed conflicts that may involve non-state parties.
Yet absent a clear statement from Congress-in the federal War
Crimes Act or elsewhere-that the kind of armed conflicts
Common Article 3 references meant to include the "war on
terror," OLC advised, Common Article 3 should be read to
avoid the constitutional problem that would arise in interfering
with the President's authority to wage a transnational "war"
against al-Qaeda.21
At the same time, in scholarly pages and m
contemporaneous OLC memoranda, Administration attorneys
argued that Article II of the Constitution grants the President
"plenary" power over treaties.22 Article II's grant of the
undefined "executive power," along with the express authority
to "make treaties," required an understanding that any treaty
related powers not specifically mentioned in Article II 
including the power to interpret, and the greater power to
terminate or suspend treaties unilaterally-must be understood
to rest with the President. "Construing the Constitution to grant
20. Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def.
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter Haynes Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38,
47 (Karen Greenberg & Joshua J. Dratel eds., 2005).
21. Id.
22. See, Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 11, at 869-70; Memorandum from John
Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to John
Bellinger, III, Senior Assoc. Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the Nat'l Sec.
Council, Re: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM
Treaty 6 & n.6 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Yoo ABM Memo], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memoabmtreaty11152001.pdf; Haynes Memo, supra note
20, at 47.
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unenumerated treaty authority to another branch could prevent
the President from exercising his core constitutional
responsibilities in foreign affairs."23 Accordingly, while "the
Court has an independent duty under Article III to determine
the meaning of a treaty in a case in which such a question is
properly presented," the Court must "give[] the executive's
interpretation of the treaty significant deference."24 Indeed, OLC
asserted, the President is the "primary interpreter of
international law and of treaties on behalf of the United
States. "25
The Bush Administration's internal views on the President's
treaty authority was soon reflected in its litigating positions. In
defending its authority to detain U.S. citizen Yaser Hamdi as an
"enemy combatant" in the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan, the
Administration insisted that the legal question whether
"captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW privileges
23. Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6.
24. Id. at n.6.
25. Id. at 6-7. The Bush Administration was hardly the first Administration to
assert executive power over treaty interpretation. The Clinton Administration OLC
maintained that it "belongs exclusively to the President to interpret and execute
treaties." Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to John Quinn, Counsel to the President (June 26, 1996), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/abmjq.htm#N_4_. But this claim was limited to the
unremarkable notion that executive power to interpret treaties follows as a necessary
corollary of the President's duty to "take Care" that the laws are faithfully executed. Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 and advising that "[t]he executive branch interprets the
requirements of an agreement as it carries out its provisions." (citation omitted)). The
modest position that the executive must have at least some power to interpret the law, if
only enough to ensure its implementation, poses no necessary threat to the "judicial
power," a power limited by the express recognition that the courts will only decide those
disputes emergent enough to constitute a case or controversy. It likewise implies no
answer to the question which of the two branches' interpretation deserves primacy when
they conflict-the separation of powers question at issue in the deference debate. In
contrast, Bush Administration assertions of executive interpretive authority in this
context rested not on the President's duty to execute the law, but on the Article II
vesting and treaty clauses. Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6-7. And they were
closely tied to assertions of the limits of judicial and legislative power in the face of
executive authority. See Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6 ("Even in the cases in
which the Supreme Court has limited executive authority, it has also emphasized that we
should not construe legislative prerogatives to prevent the executive branch 'from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."' (quoting Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977))); see also Memorandum from Sheldon
Bradshaw & Robert J. Delahunty, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to the
Senior Associate Counsel to the President & National Security Council Legal Adviser,
Re: Constitutionality of the Rohrabacher Amendment 7-8 (July 25, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/72501op.pdf ("[I]nsofar as Congress is seeking to direct the
Executive Branch to advocate Congress's interpretation of the treaty, it is usurping a
constitutional power that does not belong to it.").
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under the [Third Geneva Convention] is a quintessential matter
that the Constitution (not to mention the [Third Geneva
Convention]) leaves to the political branches and, in particular,
the President."26 To be clear, this was not a particular
determination by the President of a detainee's eligibility for
POW status on the facts. This was a generalized conclusion
about the relevance of the Third Geneva Convention to a
conflict between two state parties to the treaty (the United
States and Afghanistan). Again when the Supreme Court took
up Salim Hamdan's later challenge to the legality of military
commission
proceedings
at
Guantanamo
Bay,
the
Administration argued vigorously for judicial abstention in the
first instance, and broad deference in the second, on the
interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions-a provision requiring, inter alia, that trials be held
in a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples. "27
It was in direct response to the Supreme Court's rejection of
the government's position in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the
Administration sought and won passage of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA I). In addition to providing
legislative authorization for the tribunals the Court had found
inconsistent with Geneva Common Article 3 (among other
laws), MCA I provided that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy
combatant subject to trial by military commission under this
chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights. "28 It also attempted in Section 6 to clarify any question of
who had authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions:
As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the

President has the authority for the United States to interpret the
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to

26. Brief for the Respondents at *24 & n.9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020 ("The President-the highest 'competent authority' on
the subject-has conclusively determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, including
Hamdi, do not qualify for POW privileges under the [Third Geneva Convention]. . . . The
President's determination is based on the fact that al Qaeda and Taliban fighters
systematically do not follow the law of war and therefore do not qualify as lawful
combatants under Article 4 of the [Third Geneva Convention], entitled to POW
privileges.") (internal citations omitted).
27. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006) (citing the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
3320, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (Art. 3, <J[ l(d))).
28. 10 u .s.c. § 948(b) (2009).
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promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations
for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave
29
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
·

Pursuant to that authority, which also called for the issuance of
an Executive Order to explain how Geneva's anti-torture
restrictions were to apply to U.S. interrogation operations,
President Bush issued an Executive Order in 2007 setting forth
his interpretation of Common Article 3's parallel strictures on
the humane treatment of detainees. In it, the President read
section 6 of MCA I as "reaffirm[ing] and reinforc[ing] the
authority of the President to interpret the meaning and
application of the Geneva Conventions."30 The President's Order
thus provided that "a program" of detention and interrogation,
operated by the CIA and described in vague terms in the Order,
complied with the requirements of Common Article 3. Lest
there be any doubt, the Order stated that with respect to the
interpretation and application of Common Article 3, the Order
was to be "treated as authoritative for all purposes as a matter of
United States law, including satisfaction of the international
obligations of the United States. "31
CLUES TO THE OBAMA APPROACH
If the one-way ratchet theory is correct, one might expect to
find signs that the Obama Administration is reaching out to
reinforce, or at least not cede, the primacy of the Executive's
views in treaty interpretation, and otherwise to limit the role of
international law in constraining executive power. Yet while
published
OLC
memoranda
discussing
the
Obama
Administration's views of international law in this realm are
scarce, what early evidence is available suggests that the pattern
may not be quite so clear. Indeed, the President's most detailed

29. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (emphasis added). The remainder of Section A
provided: "(B) The President shall issue interpretations described Federal Register, by
subparagraph (A) by Executive Order published in the publication. (C) Any Executive
Order published under this paragraph shall be authoritative (except as to grave breaches
of common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other
administrative regulations. (D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
constitutional functions and responsibilities of Congress and the judicial branch of the
United States." Relatedly, Section 5 of MCA I barred any person from "invok[ing]" the
Geneva Conventions as a "source of rights" in any court of the United States.
30. Exec. Order No. 13,440(b), 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13440.htm.
31. Id.
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rhetoric on the role of the international law of armed conflict
offered a vigorous defense of the virtues of binding obligations
under international law:
Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic
interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. And
even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no
rules, I believe that the United States of America must remain
a standard bearer in the conduct of war . .. . [T]hat is why I
have reaffirmed America's commitment to abide by the
Geneva Conventions. We lose ourselves when we
compromise the very ideals that we fight to defend. And we
honor those ideals by upholding them not just when it is easy,
32
but when it is hard.

The President's first acts in office seemed broadly consistent
with such rhetoric, and included the repeal of President Bush's
Executive Order 1 3440 regarding the meaning of Common
Article 3 as applied to U.S. interrogation operations. In an
Executive Order that itself made no mention of MCA I, Section
6, or to comparable claims of presidential authority to interpret
international law, the Obama Executive Order affirmed that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was among the
sources of law constraining the behavior of U.S. interrogators.
The Order also strikingly prohibited any "officers, employees,
and other agents" conducting interrogations for the U.S.
Government from relying on any interpretation of Common
Article 3 issued by the Department of Justice between
September 1 1, 2001, and January 20, 2009. 33
Likewise, the Obama Administration separately pursued
and won passage of a revised Military Commissions Act (MCA

32. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of
the Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Nobel Peace Prize], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace
prize. Note OLC opinions would be a more instructive guide to the Administration's
understanding of the legal effect of the Conventions, but few have been made public and
none of those that have shed light on current understandings of the effect of treaty
obligations on executive power. The President's most direct formal address on the
dilemmas posed by Guantanamo Bay and related detention practices likewise said
nothing detailed about the applicability of international law per se. Delivered at the U.S.
National Archives, steps from the U.S. Constitution, the speech referred more broadly to
the rule of law and concerns of due process generally than to any particular legal source.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security, (May 21,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the
President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/.
33. Exec. Order 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 27, 2009).
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II), enacted in November 2009.34 In addition to amending the
procedures to be followed in military commission war crimes
trials (in a direction generally more favorable to commission
defendants), MCA II removed an express provision in the earlier
law limiting the ability of commission defendants to invoke the
Geneva Conventions.35 MCA I had provided: "No alien unlawful
enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under
this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights. "3 In the new law, that provision is replaced with a more
modest restriction, a prohibition against commission defendants
invoking Geneva as "a basis for a private right of action."37
Where the earlier restriction could be read to prevent
commission defendants from invoking Geneva as any "source of
rights," even in defense against a criminal action against them,
MCA II appeared to prevent defendants only from relying on
Geneva to create a separate cause of action in federal court. Put
differently, while the Geneva Conventions might not afford
commission defendants a ticket to get into court in the absence
of a separate basis for federal court jurisdiction, the Conventions
would remain available as applicable law-including as a rule of
decision-for any alien already properly in court.
Perhaps the Obama Administration's most significant
engagement on the relevance of international law to
counterterrorism operations-and its most direct engagement on
the role of the courts in sharing interpretive authority-has been
through its ongoing litigation over the detention of some 180
individuals at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Commenced under the Bush Administration, habeas cases
brought by these detainees have since turned to consider the
substantive scope of executive authority to detain individuals
under the statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), passed by Congress in 2001.38 While the AUMF itself
is silent on the question of detention per se, the Supreme Court
34. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009).
35. 10 u.s.c. § 948(b) (2009).
36. 10 u.s.c. § 948b(g) (2007).
37. Id. § 948b(e) (2009).
38. The AUMF authorizes the use of "all necessary and appropriate force" against
those "nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons." Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224-25.
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held in 2004 that the AUMF at a minimum extended to
authorize the detention of individuals who were "part of or
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States' there."39 Whether the AUMF could be
read to authorize the detention of a broader set of individuals 
including those captured outside Afghanistan, or including those
merely "supporting" hostilities without being directly engaged 
has been a central question in recent litigation.40 While the Bush
and Obama Administrations have in some respects put forward
substantially similar substantive definitions of who may be
detained under this authority,41 Obama Administration briefs
embrace the relevance of international law in understanding the
scope of the AUMF to a far greater degree. Likewise, where
Bush Administration demands for judicial deference to the
interpretive views of the Executive were prominent, Obama
Administration briefs have largely relegated discussions of the
applicable degree of deference to the footnotes.
Consider the Administrations' relative briefing on the scope
of the government's power to hold "enemy combatant"
detainees in military custody. The Bush Administration filed
unclassified judicial briefs setting forth a detailed understanding
of the scope of its authority to hold such detainees on a number
of occasions. In none of them did it rely on the international law
of armed conflict as either a font of authority or effective

39. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 521 ("[W]e understand Congress' grant of authority for
the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to detain for the
duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on long-standing law-of
war principles.").
40. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); al-Maqaleh v.
Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009).
41. Compare Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 8, al-Maqaleh 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (No. 1:06-cv-01669) [hereinafter
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss], available at http://sites.google.com/a/ijnetwork.org/
maqaleh-v--gates/test-joint-appendix (follow "Maqaleh v. Gates, 1:06-cv-01669, Dkt. 18,
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, filed September 15, 2008" hyperlink) with Memorandum from Frank Sweigart,
Dir. of Office of the Admin. Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S.
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Department of Defense, Procedure for Review of
"New Evidence" Relating to Enemy Combatant (EC) Status (May 7, 2007), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/May2007/New%20Evidence%20Instruction.pdf. See also
William Glaberson, President's Detention Plan Tests American Legal Tradition, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/us/politics/
23detain.html.
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limitation on the power of the U.S. Executive.42 On the contrary,
while maintaining that adequate detention authority could be
found in the President's Article II powers standing alone, the
Bush Administration understood the AUMF as an additional
source of authority for detention under which the Executive's
definition of "enemy combatants" was a "reasonable
implementation of the President's responsibility to 'determine'
the object of the use of force authorized by the AUMF," a
determination subject to "the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation. "43 To the extent the international law of armed
conflict was relevant to defining who may be detained under the
AUMF, it was only in rebuttal to detainees' arguments to that
effect.44 Indeed, the Administration had rejected arguments that
the Geneva Conventions could be invoked by detainees seeking
habeas relief at all on the grounds that, inter alia, (1) Geneva
"supplies no basis for granting habeas relief because it is not self
executing" and therefore "does not confer any privately
enforceable rights," and (2) the President's determination that
the Geneva rules protected neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban
fighters was conclusive as a matter of la w .45
In contrast, the Obama Administration's opening legal brief
setting forth its position on the scope of the government's
detention authority over the detainees at Guantanamo Bay is
shot through with reference to and reliance on international law.
In addition to abandoning the Bush Administration argument
that Article II of the Constitution itself provides adequate,
independent authorization for the President to detain individuals
engaged in armed conflict against the United States, the brief
states at the outset that "[t]he detention authority conferred by
the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of
war," a body of law that includes "prohibitions and obligations"
either "codified in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions" or
recognized as "customary international law."46 Indeed, while
42. See Respondents' Statement of Legal Justification for Detention, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig. (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) (Misc. No. 08-442) (summary
filing locating the source of executive detention power in Article II and the AUMF,
without citation to Geneva Conventions).
43. Brief for the Respondents, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 061195, 06-1196).
44. Id.
45. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 26.
46. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (D.D.C. Mar.13, 2009) [hereinafter Respondents'
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acknowledging that the law of armed conflict was less well
developed for conflicts between states and armed groups (as
opposed to conflicts between state powers alone), the brief
maintained that "[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules
governing international [state-to-state] armed conflicts" must
nonetheless inform the interpretation of the scope of authority
granted by the AUMF.47 Relying on the United Nations Charter,
as well as UN and NATO resolutions adopted in the wake of the
September 1 1, 2001 attacks on the United States affirming the
right of states to individual or collective self-defense, the brief
understands the AUMF as, among other things, invoking "the
internationally recognized right to self-defense. "48 The only
mention of judicial deference comes eventually in a footnote
arguing that the court should defer to "the President's judgment
that the AUMF, construed in light of the law-of-war principles
that inform its interpretation, entitle[ s] him to treat members of
irregular forces as state military forces are treated for purposes
of detention. "49 Notably, this appears to seek "deference" from
the court not so the President may treat detainees under the
AUMF however he thinks "necessary and appropriate" (in the
language of the AUMF) or to a determination that the
Guantanamo detainees are entitled to lesser or no protection
under the law of war because they are not regular fighters (as the
Bush Administration had maintained), but to a determination
that irregular forces are entitled to the same status as state
military forces "for purposes of detention." In other words, one
could read the brief as seeking deference to the notion that
Geneva imposes greater duties of protection upon the Executive
than courts (or the previous Administration) had thus far
recognized.
REWINDING THE ONE-WAY RATCHET?
Such a passing collection of examples provides an
admittedly modest basis for drawing broad conclusions about the
habits of executives once in power. Nonetheless, it seems worth
Memorandum].
47. Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 46, at 3 (U.S. authority to hold
Guantanamo detainees "is derived from the AUMF, which empowers the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force to prosecute the war, in light of law-of-war
principles that inform the understanding of what is 'necessary and appropriate"').
48. Respondents' Memorandum, supra note 46, at 4-5.
49. Id. at 6 n.2.
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considering what if anything the relative difference in approach
taken by the two administrations tells us about the nature of
shifts in executive power-and the potential role of international
law in achieving any moderating effect. We might usefully
consider a range of possibilities below in attempting to explain
the forces motivating the seeming shift in executive engagement
with the Geneva regime. The options are not meant to be
mutually exclusive; indeed, it seems likely that more than one
explanation is required to understand an administration's
behavior-and the behavior of the multiple constituencies within
each administration. Still, each explanation carries different
implications for the salience of the one-way ratchet theory, and
it is helpful to unpack them separately. We begin with the
possibility of least significance to the one-way ratchet view
namely, Bush-to-Obama has seen no real change in
understanding of the constraints imposed by international law at
all.
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PAPER TIGER
A first potential response to the account of shifting
language above is that it is all rhetoric, no reality. While the
Obama Administration's speeches and even legal briefs may
invoke international law with more frequency or attention than
did its predecessor administration, in fact the result is effectively
the same. In particular, the Obama Administration continues to
maintain that the United States is engaged in an ongoing global
armed conflict of indefinite duration against a terrorist
organization, and that it therefore has the authority to detain a
broad swath of "belligerents" at Guantanamo Bay (and in
Afghanistan), a category of individuals that includes members
and mere "supporters" of al-Qaeda, wherever they may be
seized.50 The Administration may believe international law is
50. Compare Respondents' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 24, al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009) (Nos. 061668, 08-1307, 08-2143)), with Brief for the Respondents at 67, Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196). The Obama Administration has likewise taken
the position in briefing that detainees held at the newly built U.S. detention facility at
Parwan at Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan (the successor prison to the Bagram Theater
Internment Facility) are not entitled to seek habeas corpus in U.S. federal courts.
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 41, at 2-3. At the same time, the
Administration has taken aggressive steps to transfer detention operations in
Afghanistan to the Afghans, in keeping with an effort to bring the United States in line
with international legal obligations. STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, COMMANDER'S INITIAL
ASSESSMENT at F-1 (2009), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
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relevant to understanding the scope of the AUMF, but it also
effectively contends that international law allows it to do
precisely what the Bush Administration insisted it could do
under differently cast legal authority. Likewise, President
Obama may have issued an Executive Order reqmnng
compliance in interrogations with Common Article 3, but as the
Obama Order itself demonstrates, Executive Orders are readily
subject to revision. It could easily issue a contrary Executive
Order tomorrow. And while the new Military Commissions Act
may allow detainees to raise Geneva Convention rights in
defense against war crimes prosecution, Convention law is
notoriously vague on what in fact is meant by Common Article
3's guarantee of "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples. "51 Given the scope of
procedural rights already available to Commission defendants,52
the Conventions per se are unlikely to require the
Administration to behave any differently than it would already
under existing statutory (and constitutional) requirements. In
this regard, the fact that the Administration cites international
legal obligations has no bearing at all on the scope of the power
it in fact asserts. Indeed, it asserts just as much power as the
predecessor regime. At worst, international law is used to
provide additional diplomatic-and legal-cover for pursuing
policies that expand executive power further.
The paper tiger account is tempting in a number of respects,
most especially in its description of the relative similarity of
detention policies between the post-Boumediene Bush
Administration
(confronting
detainees'
constitutional
entitlement to seek � �beas . co�pus� and th� pre-Guantana
. �o
closure Obama Admm1strat1on. - Still, the view that nothmg m
practice has changed seems to give short shrift to recent
Administration behavior in invoking international law. For one
thing, some of the Administration's invocations of international
law were in fact accompanied by the specific rejection of a
politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. ("It is critical that we continue to
develop and build capacity to empower the Afghan government to conduct all detentions
operations in this country in accordance with international and national law."); see also
Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l1/16/world/asia/16bagram.html? _r=2.
51. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing procedural rules emerging from Common Article 3).
52. 28 U.S.C. 2241, et seq.
53. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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broader assertion of practical power by the pnor
Administration. The Bush Administration maintained that it
enjoyed the power, for instance, to subject terrorist suspects to a
form of mock execution by drowning (often called
waterboarding).54 The Obama Administration has renounced
that power.55 The Bush Administration embraced rules for
military commissions that permitted the admissibility of
testimony obtained under "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment" under certain circumstances.56 The Obama
Administration's revised military commission bill bars the use of
such testimony.57 The Bush Administration maintained that
Congress and even the courts were limited in their authority to
determine the meaning of treaties by virtue of the President's
own formal constitutional power over treaty interpretation.58 The
Obama Administration has to date advanced no such
.
understandmg. 59
Perhaps more important, even if one accepts the argument
that the Obama Administration's references to the constraints of
international law are more rhetorical than real, the question
remains why an Executive would change even its rhetorical
54. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 2004 WL 3554701 (O.L.C.) (Dec. 30,
2004); COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (Comm. Print 2008), available at
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%
2022%202009.pdf.
55. Senate Confirmation Hearings: Eric Holder, Day One, Wash. Post 11 (Jan. 16,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/16/us/politics/16text-holder.
html?pagewanted=ll. It is true that executive orders are easily revoked, but all law could
of course be changed pursuant to appropriate procedures; the prospect that the law
might change does not undermine the binding nature of the legal obligation during the
time it exists.
56. 10 U.S.C. § 948r.
57. Id. § 948r(a).
58. See, e.g., Yoo, Politics as Law?, supra note 11, at 869-77 (arguing this in the
context of the ABM treaty); Yoo ABM Memo, supra note 22, at 6 & n.6 (making the
argument in the context of the ABM treaty again); Haynes Memo, supra note 20, at 47
(arguing this in the context of the Geneva Conventions).
59. Indeed, a federal appeals court recently rejected the Obama Administration's
position that international law must be understood as informing the interpretation of the
AUMF. al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("The international laws of
war as a whole have not been implemented domestically by Congress and are therefore
not a source of authority for U.S. courts. . . . Therefore, while the international laws of
war are helpful to courts when identifying the general set of war powers to which the
AUMF speaks, their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition render their use
both inapposite and inadvisable when courts seek to determine the limits of the
President's war powers." (citations omitted)).
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stance toward treaty law in a way that might imply a limit on
power previously asserted. One can imagine various answers to
this question as well-and some are considered in the discussion
of alternative explanations for recent shifts below. But the most
basic explanation for the Executive's one-way ratchet
tendencies-the existence of political incentives that drive
Presidents to claim more power rather than less-does not seem
to explain why a President would make such a rhetorical move.
On the contrary, if domestic political posturing were the most
salient explanation, one might equally imagine a new President
moving visibly- even if not practically-to embrace and
consolidate broader authority by rejecting international law
constraints conclusively.60
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LITIGATION STRATEGY
A second possible reading of Obama Administration
actions would acknowledge that the Administration has shifted
posture somewhat-at least rhetorically and in some respects
practically-to recognize legal constraints posed by treaty
obligations, but would attribute the Administration's behavior to
savvy and necessary litigation strategy in the numerous Geneva
related cases that have moved and are moving through the
domestic federal courts. Since 2001, the Supreme Court has
issued a series of decisions recognizing to varying degrees the
relevance of international law to executive policies of detention
and trial. Most significant among these: the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
plurality opinion in 2004, which made no mention of judicial
deference to the Executive and expressly construed the AUMF
in light of "longstanding law-of-war principles";61 and Hamdan,
two years later, in which the Court was even more aggressively
non-deferential to executive treaty interpretation, squarely
rejecting the Bush Administration's position that Common
Article 3 did not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan.62 It is on
these two issues in particular-the relevance of international law
to the interpretation of the AUMF and the applicability of
Common Article 3 to interrogation operations-that the Obama

60. See Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 483 (2010) (describing public opinion polls finding that many Americans, and
sometimes majorities, support counterterrorism practices involving "heavy force,"
including harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding).
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion).
62. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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Administration has been most aggressive in embracing the
constraints of international law. Under the circumstances,
Administration attorneys would have been foolish at best not to
recognize the implications of such holdings in its policy positions
and legal briefs.
At the same time, where the courts have been less vocal in
checking executive prerogatives, the Obama position has
remained largely unchanged from the Bush position. Recall, for
example, that the Supreme Court issued a ruling much more
favorable to the Executive in Munaf v. Ge ren,63 an often
overlooked 2008 decision in which the Court reached out to
decide the merits of a habeas petition filed by Americans held by
U.S. forces in Iraq. Among other claims, the Americans had
argued that U.S. obligations under the Convention Against
Torture (and federal implementing regulations) barred the
United States from transferring them to the Iraqis for criminal
prosecution given the likelihood that they would face torture in
Iraqi custody.64 While the Court avoided deciding key aspects of
the transfer question as a matter of law, it took an enormously
deferential stance toward the Executive's factual determination
that the United States had received adequate assurances from
the Iraqis that the Americans would be reasonably treated.65 In
parallel contrast, the Obama Administration's position on its
63. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
64. Id. at 2226 & n.6 (2008) (citing Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, adopted Jan. 9, 1975, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 6 (1988) ("No State Party shall expel, return
('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture") (addressing claims
under Foreign Affairs Restructuring and Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div.
G, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998)).
65. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226 (2008) ("In these cases the United States explains
that, although it remains concerned about torture among some sectors of the Iraqi
Government, the State Department has determined that the Justice Ministry - the
department that would have authority over Munaf and Omar-as well as its prison and
detention facilities have 'generally met internationally accepted standards for basic
prisoner needs.' The Solicitor General explains that such determinations are based on
'the Executive's assessment of the foreign country's legal system and . . . the
Executive['s] . . . ability to obtain foreign assurances it considers reliable.' The Judiciary
is not suited to second-guess such determinations -determinations that would require
federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the
Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area. In contrast, the political
branches are well situated to consider sensitive foreign policy issues, such as whether
there is a serious prospect of torture at the hands of an ally, and what to do about it if
there is. As Judge Brown noted, 'we need not assume the political branches are oblivious
to these concerns. Indeed, the other branches possess significant diplomatic tools and
leverage the judiciary lacks."') (internal citations omitted).
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authority to transfer terrorist suspects from one country to
another outside standard extradition channels -the practice of
so-called 'extraordinary rendition'-has been little changed from
the Bush Administration. Indeed, the Obama Administration
early on moved to embrace the existing executive view that
diplomatic assurances are an adequate means for guarding
against the transfer of individuals to countries where they may
face torture.66 Where the Court's decisions had not clearly
compelled otherwise, the Administration thus embraced the
generally broad authority the past President asserted, despite the
evidently broad swath of international law regulating interstate
transfers. In short, the argument proceeds, the Obama
Administration has ceded power claimed by the Bush
Administration only to the extent that it has been compelled to
do so by the domestic courts. Such behavior should not,
therefore, be understood as bearing on that aspect of the one
way ratchet theory that maintains that executives have no
political or institutional incentive to willingly cede power their
predecessors have effectively seized. In this case, there is nothing
'willing' about it.
It may well be the case that the Obama Administration's
relatively greater embrace of international legal constraints in
this realm can be attributed at least in part to its realistic
assessment of the domestic legal consequences of a contrary
view. But some caution may be in order before concluding that
litigation is a complete explanation. First, the Supreme Court's
rulings in Hamdi and Hamdan only went so far. They did not of
themselves compel the Administration to take any action with
respect to interrogation policy per se; nor did they require the
Administration to ease restrictions on the invocation of the
Geneva Conventions by defendants in military commission
trials. And while the Court was far from deferential to the
Executive's interpretation of international law in either case, the
Court hardly precluded Executives from raising strong
arguments in favor of judicial deference or abstention in the
future. Yet while Obama Administration briefs are not devoid of
requests for judicial deference to executive treaty
interpretation-indeed, obligations of zealous advocacy would
seem to require Administration lawyers to invoke whatever such
Greg Miller, Obama Preserves Renditions as a Counter-Terrorism Tool, L.A.
Feb. 1, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/Ol/nation/
na+renditionl.
66.

TIMES,
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arguments are reasonably available-such demands are notably
muted compared to the previous Administration. Perhaps more
striking than the Guantanamo brief described above, the
Administration recently filed a brief urging the Supreme Court
to deny certiorari in the case of Manuel Noriega, the sole official
"prisoner of war" currently in U.S. custody. Noriega had argued
unsuccessfully in federal habeas court that the Third Geneva
Convention requirement of repatriation at the conclusion of
hostilities precluded the United States from extraditing him to
France to face criminal prosecution.67 The United States had
vigorously disputed this reading of the Convention on its merits,
and the Obama Administration reasserted that argument in its
Supreme Court brief. But far from the Bush Administration's
position in Hamdi that the President's views on the applicability
of Geneva to the Afghan conflict was "conclusive" as a matter of
law on the Court,68 the Obama Administration made a far more
modest claim-namely that the Executive's views on the
meaning of the treaty were entitled to a degree of "respect,"69 a
notably lesser degree of deference than "great weight" on the
continuum of standards usually discussed.70 One might conceive
of a litigation strategy that makes it sensible for the Executive to
demand less deference from the Court than it believes it
deserves. But the strategic motivation from a litigation
perspective is far from obvious.
Perhaps more important, even if litigation strategy were a
67. Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. Brief for the Respondents supra note 26, at 23-24 ("Both Article 5 and the
military's regulations call for a military tribunal only when there is 'doubt' as to an
individual's 'legal status' under the [Third Geneva Convention] to receive POW
privileges, and not as to each and every captured combatant. In the case of Hamdi and
the other al Qaeda and Taliban detainees in the current conflict, there is no such doubt.
The President-the highest 'competent authority' on the subject-has conclusively
determined that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, including Hamdi, do not qualify for
POW privileges under the [Third Geneva Convention].").
69. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at *11-12, Noriega, 130 S.Ct. 1002
(2010) (No. 09-35), 2009 WL 2904602 ("[T]he court of appeals' conclusion that
petitioner's extradition to France is not barred by the Third Geneva Convention is a
reasonable construction of the convention that comports with its text and overall
purposes. The court of appeals' reading is also consistent with the views of the Executive
Branch, which are entitled to respect." (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty
provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement
is entitled to great weight."))).
70. William Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083 (2008).

544

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:523

complete answer, there are reasons to pause before concluding
from this that the Administration's relative acceptance of greater
international legal constraints poses no challenge to the one-way
ratchet view. On the contrary, the success of the one-way ratchet
approach to presidential power has been thought to depend not
only on executive incentives, but also on the existence of an
equal and opposite set of incentives by Congress and particularly
the courts. That is, the one-way ratchet has worked because the
President's propensity to seek power has been met by the
judiciary's propensity to let him have it.71 If the President is now
in fact reining in assertions of authority in response to judicial
push-back, the litigation strategy explanation is in this sense an
argument that the ratchet mechanism is not altogether
functioning as expected.
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS TRANSNATIONAL PROCESS
A third set of potential explanations poses perhaps the
greatest challenge to the one-way ratchet view. Consider next
that the Obama Administration is indeed responding to political
incentives as the one-way ratchet view contemplates, but those
incentives are, in this instance, pushing the Administration to
seek greater constraints on its power. From the rich literature on
why states comply with international law,72 one might explain the
phenomenon in various ways. On one view, the Obama
Administration's early behavior is a case study in the
transnational legal process explanation of why states comply
with international law. The notion here, advanced by Harold
Koh among others, is that once a nation enters a regime of
international legal rules-say, the rules regulating armed
conflict-its bureaucracy and governing apparatus are drawn
into a dialectic engagement with a range of governmental and
nongovernmental actors seeking to ensure the mutual domestic
internalization of those rules.73 As those rules become
internalized by domestic legal and social structures and
institutions, they themselves function to ensure ongoing
compliance.74 If such a mechanism is at work here, the Obama
71. KOH, supra note 1, at 134-49.
72. See generally FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harold H. Koh &
Oona A. Hathaway eds., 2005) (reviewing and assembling literature).
73. Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2651 (1997).
74. Id. (describing transnational legal process as "the evolutionary process whereby
repeated compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience.").
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Administration is simply manifesting the political success such
transnational actors have had during the past eight years in
forcing the more effective internalization of Geneva rules.
Transnational nongovernmental organizations, the news
media, academic advocates, and civil society more broadly can
indeed make a strong case of having played an instrumental role
in bringing about what change has occurred. It was hardly an
accident that the group flanking President Obama in the Oval
Office when he signed the early Executive Order mandating
compliance with Common Article 3 was a collection of retired
U.S. admirals and generals.75 The group had been catalyzed and
organized over a period of years by the NGO Human Rights
First, and had played a pivotal role in securing the passage of an
amendment, sponsored by Senator John McCain, to the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 clarifying that the international
law ban on "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" applies
wherever U.S. officials operate.76 In addition, a series of
investigative reports, including those conducted by the
Pentagon, surrounding the publication of photos of torture by
U.S. agents at Abu Ghraib found rampant violations of
Convention rules, and recommended disciplinar� (and on
occasion criminal) action against troops involved. 7 The U.S.
Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector
Operations likewise underwent revision in 2006, and emerged
reinforcing the guidance that all interrogation operations were to
be conducted within the constraints established by the McCain
Amendment, the Geneva Conventions, and other relevant laws.78
The examples could go on.
Yet one might also identify various objections to this view.
As was made apparent by the internal opposition the Bush
Administration faced within the Pentagon when it moved to ease
Geneva restrictions, Geneva Convention rules had been

75. Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay, CNN.COM (Jan. 22, 2009) ,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/Ol/22/guantanamo.order/index.html.
76. For a discussion of the role retired military leaders played in this and other anti
torture initiatives, see Deborah Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive
Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L. J. 1255, 1279-88 (2006) .
77. See, e.g. , MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004 ) , available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/
detainees/taguba/TAGUBA_REPORT CERTIFICATIONS.pdf.
78. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR
OPERATIONS
(2006) , available at http://www.army.mil/institution/
armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf.
_
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seemingly well internalized already by the U.S. Armed Forces 
in Army regulations implementing the Conventions, in field
manual rules, in training programs, in legal instruction-in the
years following Vietnam.7 It is possible that the domestic and
international response to events like Abu Ghraib somehow
solidified the internalization of these norms in a way that had
not happened before, but the degree of difference is not entirely
clear. And while some of the government responses to Bush
Administration policies tended to reinforce Geneva norms,
other responses have had more the opposite effect. For instance,
in an amendment to the federal habeas corpus statute still on the
books, Congress in 2006 barred individuals from so much as
"invoking" the Geneva Conventions as a "source of rights" in
any U.S. court.80 The effect, and legality, of this provision
79. Military lawyers in particular pushed back vigorously against Bush
Administration efforts to avoid the strictures of the Geneva regime. See, e.g., 151 CONG.
REC. S8794 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham) (introducing into the
congressional record memos prepared by service JAG officers, including Memorandum
from Brig. Gen. Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate to Commandant of the
Marine Corps, to Gen. Counsel for the Dep't of the Air Force, Re: Working
Group Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations (Feb. 27, 2003); Memorandum
from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Air Force, to General
Counsel for the Dep't of the Air Force, Re: Comment on Draft Report and
Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational
Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War
on Terrorism (Feb. 6, 2003) ("[T]he use of the more extreme interrogation techniques
simply is not how the U.S. armed forces have operated in recent history. We have taken
the legal and moral 'high-road' in the conduct of our military operations regardless of
how others may operate. Our forces are trained in this legal and moral mindset beginning
the day they enter active duty. It should be noted that law of armed conflict and code of
conduct training have been mandated by Congress and emphasized since the Viet Nam
conflict when our POWs were subjected to torture by their captors. We need to consider
the overall impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as giving official
approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques that U.S. forces
have consistently been trained are unlawful."); Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Thomas J.
Romig, Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Army, to Gen. Counsel for the Dep't of the Air
Force, Re: Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the
Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by
the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Mar. 3, 2003) ("While the OLC
analysis speaks to a number of defenses that could be raised on behalf of those who
engage in interrogation techniques later perceived to be illegal, the 'bottom line' defense
proffered by OLC is an exceptionally broad concept of 'necessity.' This defense is based
upon the premise that any existing federal statutory provision or international obligation
is unconstitutional per se, where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the President,
acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as essential to his capacity to wage war. I
question whether this theory would ultimately prevail in either the U.S. courts or in any
international forum. If such a defense is not available, soldiers ordered to use otherwise
illegal techniques run a substantial risk of criminal prosecution or personal liability
arising from a civil lawsuit.")).
80. 28 U.S.C.A. § 224l(e) (2007) (attempting to strip the courts of jurisdiction over
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remains to be tested conclusively.81 At a minimum, however, it
must be seen as an obstacle to the enforcement of the Geneva
Conventions that did not previously exist.
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST THE ONE-WAY RATCHET
If the transnational legal process effect here seems
uncertain, it may be more useful to consider a related
explanation an international legal realist might offer. In this
view, both Bush and Obama Administrations have pursued
realist objectives. Both Administrations read treaty obligations
in a way that serves the Executive's national security strategy;
the Obama Administration simply has a somewhat different
national security strategy than the Bush Administration did. The
dramatic exchange of internal memos early in the Bush
Administration with contrasting recommendations to the
President regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions
sheds useful light on this distinction. Then White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales had embraced the OLC view (described
above) that the Third Geneva Convention had no application to
the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, basing his argument in
significant part on the Administration's strategic policy interests
in "preserv[ing] flexibility" in the new "war against terrorism,"
facilitating the rapid collection of information from detainees,
and leaving open future options for the treatment of non-state
actors.82 In response, then Secretary of State Colin Powell took a
very different view of the strategic wisdom of the wholesale
rejection of the application of Geneva to the conflict in
habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees) . The Obama Administration has also
faced strong criticism for its decision not to pursue more aggressively criminal
prosecution of former Bush Administration officials for their involvement with the
torture of detainees in U.S. custody. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, When Presidential
Sermons Collide, SALON.COM, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.salon.com/ ( search for "When
Presidential Sermons Collide"; then follow "When Presidential Sermons Collide"
hyperlink under "Archived Results") . Critics have voiced concern that failure to pursue
prosecutions here will undermine the ability of Geneva Convention prohibitions against
torture to deter officials in future conflicts. See, e.g., Mark Danner, If Everyone Knew,
Who's to Blame, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/24/AR2009042402654.html?hpid=opinionsboxl.
81. See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010 ) ( No. 09-35 ) (denying certiorari) ;
Al Warafi v. Obama, 2101 WL 1404001, *10 (D.D.C. 2010 ) (holding that the 2006
amendment bars detainee from claiming in habeas proceeding that his detention is
unlawful under the First Geneva Convention).
82. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to the
President of the United States, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002 ) , in TH E
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 20, at 118-21.
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Afghanistan.83 Insisting that particularized determinations about
the availability of prisoner-of-war protections to individual
detainees leaves room for substantial strategic flexibility, Powell
emphasized that a lack of adherence to the Geneva regime
would have a significant negative impact on U.S.
counterterrorism efforts, undermining cooperative relationships
with allies, and limiting the power of U.S. moral authority to
persuade wavering neutrals in the struggle against international
terrorism. 84
While the Obama Administration may not yet have had
occasion to articulate its full understanding of the President's
treaty interpretation power in general, its rhetoric surely
embraces the Powell view of the United States' strategic
interests in Geneva compliance in particular. As the President
explained in a highly publicized May 2009 speech at the National
Archives in Washington, D . C. :
W e uphold our most cherished values not only because doing
so is right, but because it strengthens our country and it keeps
us safe. Time and again, our values have been our best
national security -asset - in war and peace; in times of ease
and in eras of upheaval. Fidelity to our values is the reason
why . . . enemy soldiers have surrendered to us in battle,
knowing they'd receive better treatment from America's
Armed Forces than from their own government. It's the
reason why America has benefitted from strong alliances that
amplified our power, and drawn a sharp, moral contrast with
our adversaries . . . . And where terrorists offer only the
injustice of disorder and destruction, America must
demonstrate that our values and our institutions are more
5
resilient than a hateful ideology. 8

For President Obama, the Bush interpretation of Geneva that
enabled the use of waterboarding and the establishment of the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay "serve[d] as a recruitment
83. Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, to the Counsel to the
President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision
for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in
Afghanistan, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 20, at 122-25.
84. Powell also urged than wholesale rejection of Geneva would potentially further
endanger U.S. troops who fall into this or other enemies' hands, and confuse troops
charged with detention operations (whose only training had been to Geneva Convention
standards). Id. While starkly critical of the Gonzales/OLC view, the Powell memo took
no position on the President's structural authority to interpret Geneva conclusively one
way or another.
85. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 32.
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tool for terrorists, and increase[d] the will of our enemies to fight
us, while decreasing the will of others to work with America.
In short, the Bush interpretation no longer served the Obama
presidency's strategic approach to counterterrorism. For the
realist, executive compliance, vel non, with international legal
obligations is and ever has been a function of presidential
political assessments of the national interest-and in this regard,
it is in line with the one-way ratchet thesis. It just so happens
that in this case, the political incentives to which the Executive is
responding lead it to embrace rather than shun legal constraint.
The notion that the two administrations have articulated
differing views of their counterterrorism approaches at the
strategic level is not difficult to accept. 87 It is likewise certainly
true that the Obama interpretation of Geneva-to prohibit
waterboarding, for example-is in line with the policy strategy
the new Administration has articulated. But if the strategic
interest explanation is right, the consequences for the one-way
ratchet theory are severe. That is, this explanation for the
Obama Administration's behavior would accept that the
President responds to domestic and international political
incentives (including allies' pressure to comply), but it would
also suggest that those incentives might on occasion at least lead
the ratchet to swing either way - toward greater or lesser
assertions of executive power, or, at a minimum, to something
other than a perennial executive commitment to power
maximization over issues of national security.
"86

86. Id. The notion that the Bush approach was comprom1smg relations with
international allies was hardly the President's alone. A remarkable study by a committee
of the British Parliament reported that "Britain pulled out of some planned covert
operations with the Central Intelligence Agency, including a major one in 2005, when it
was unable to obtain assurances that the actions would not result in rendition and
inhumane treatment." Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S.
Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007. The full report of the
Committee
is
available
at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.
cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/intelligence/20070725_isc_final.pdf. See also Craig
Whitlock, Testimony Helps Detail CIA's Post-9111 Reach, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at
Al (quoting State Department legal adviser John B. Bellinger III as indicating that
ongoing disputes with U.S. allies have "undermined cooperation and intelligence
activities").
87. See also Nobel Peace Prize, supra note 32; John Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, A New Approach for
Safeguarding Americans, Address Before the Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies (Aug. 6,
2009), available at http://csis.org/files/attachments/090806_brennan_transcript.pdf; Senate
Confirmation Hearings: Eric Holder, Day One, N.Y. TIMES, , Jan. 16, 2009, at 11,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/16/us/politics/16text-holder.html?
pagewanted=l l.
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CONCLUSION
If the realist explanation turns out to be a meaningful piece
of the puzzle in this particular case, then there are interesting
implications for both constitutional and international law. For
constitutional law, the realist effect demonstrates the need to
revisit and perhaps update our understanding of the political
pressures facing the President, to better account for the pressure
that may be applied by an international community with
structures, laws and norms vastly better developed than those
facing the Presidency as it stood at the founding, or immediately
following World War II. For international law, the realist
explanation offers another example of the ways in which
international law, while often lacking in institutional
enforcement mechanisms, may well shape state conduct
nonetheless. Under any circumstances, it remains to be seen
whether the Obama Administration's initial moves surrounding
the Geneva regime will be sustained, or swamped by larger
initiatives. In the meantime, this early example opens an avenue
for greater exploration at the conclusion of the Administration's
term.

